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PlDOPLE 11. Roes [67 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 10533. In Bank. July 20, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JIMMIE LEE 
ROSS, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Searches-Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest.-A search 
of a person incidental to a lawful arrest is valid. 
[2] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause-DeAnition.-
Reasonable cause for arrest is defined as that state of facts as 
would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and 
conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that 
the person is guilty of a crime. 
[8] Id..-WithoutWarrant-B.easonable Oause-Determination.-
There is no exact formula for the determination of reasonable 
cause for an arrest; each case must be decided on the facts 
and circumstances presented to the officers at th~ time they 
were required to act. 
[4] Id..-Without Warrant-Reasonable Oause-Information From 
OJEcial 8ources.-In making an arrest without a warrant, 
police officers are entitled to rely on information from official 
sources, including radio broadcasts from other police units. 
l5] Id~-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause-Facts Bstablish-
ing: Searches Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest.-
Probable cause existed for the arrest of a suspect by the 
police and the incidental search of his person was valid, where 
the arresting officers had been informed by radio of a robbery, 
of the description of defendant's ear, which they earlier 
pursued, of the defendant himself, and of the place where the 
pursuit ended, in the vicinity of which, shortly afterwards, 
they found defendant, who matched precisely the description 
that had been" given to them. " 
[8a,6b] Searchea-Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest: Seiz-
1lI'8 of Evidentia.l"J' Matter.-The seizure by police of a rob-
bery suspect's money and effects, found on his person when he 
was booked, was lawful, and it was immaterial that the court 
[2] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.J'ur.2d, Arrest, § 44-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 24; [2] 
Arrest, § 12(4); [3] Arrest, § 12(7); [4] Arrest, § 12(9); [5] 
Arrest, § 12(13) ; Searches and Seizures, § 24; [6, 7] Searches and 
Seizures, §§ 24, 35, 36; [8] Robbery, § 23; Criminal Law, t1080 
(6); "[9, 10] Criminal Law, § 264(4); [11] Criminal Law. § 565 
(4); [12] Criminal Law, §§ 628(1), 852.2; [18] Criminal Law, 
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later ordered some of the money returned to him as being 
surplus to the amount stolen and unconnected with the issues 
of the case. 
[?] Id.-Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest: Seizure of Evi-
dentiary Matter.-The search of an arrested person at the 
time of his "booking" is reasonable, as being contemporaneous 
with his arrest; his personal effects may be removed from him, 
and the police may examine them to see if they have been 
stolen, return them to the prisoner on his release, or preserve 
them for use as evidence at the time of trial. 
[8] Robbery-Evidence-Admissibility-Demonstrative Evidence: 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Necessity for Objection.-In a rob-
bery trial, the accused's money and personal effects which 
were of evidentiary value were properly received in evidence, 
where they had been validly seized on his arrest, and espe-
cially where two employees of the robbed company had seen 
him take money from the company desk and place it in his 
pockets (even though the money removed from him was not 
actually identified as the coins or currency actually stolen). In 
any event, such alleged error, to which no objection was made 
at the trial, could not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
[9a,9b] Criminal Law-Trial-Custody a.nd Restraint of Accused. 
-An accused was not prejudiced at his trial by the sheriff's 
reasonable security precaution of bringing him into the court-
room handcuffed, where the jury knew, from the charges 
against him of robbery and attempted murder, that he was in 
custody, where he had previously been convicted of robbery, 
and where the handcuffs were removed prior to the initiation 
of any judicial proceedings. 
[10] Id.-Trial-Custody and Restraint of Accused.-Unless there 
is danger of escape, an. accused is generally entitled to appear, 
during the progress of his trial, free of shackles, but when 
reasonable precautions are taken to retain custody of him the 
fact that they bring before the jury information that a 
defendant is a convict and perhaps a dangerous character does 
not deprive him of a fair trial. 
[l1] Id.-Evidence-Weight-Identity - Matter for Jury.-The 
weight to be given to the circumstances of an accused's identi-
fication from a picture of a police lineup was a matter for the 
jury; the fact that the picture showed the accused in coveralls 
and the others in street clothes did not constitute prejudicial 
error, and might even have been advantageous to the accused 
as affording him an opportunity to impeach the veracity of the 
identification. 
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[12] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Defendant's Refusal to Testify: 
Instructions.-The Griffin rule, holding that comment by court 
or counsel on an accused's failure to testify (Const., art. I, 
§ 13) violates the privilege against self-incrimination under 
U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends., is applicable to cases pend- - ----
ing on direct appeal at the time the Griffin decision was 
announced. 
[13] Id.-Appeal-Federal Constitutional Error-Burden of Prov-
ing Harmless.-In a criminal appeal, the prosecution bears the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal 
constitutional error proved harmless, namely, that there was 
no reasonable possibility for its having affected the outcome of 
the trial. Once that burden has been discharged, the error no 
longer serves as a basis for reversal. 
[14a, 14b] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Comment on FaUure of 
Defendant to Testify.-In an attempted murder trial, error of 
court· and counsel. in commenting on defendant's failure to 
testify was not reversible, where the defense in no way sug-
gested someone other than defendant might have perpetrated 
the crime, and where, as the case was presented to the jury, 
only two conclusions were possible, one of which was inher-
~ntly incredible, and the other, that defendant was the perpe-
trator. 
[16] Id.-Appeal-l'rejudicial Error ........ Comment on Defendant's 
Failure to Testify.-Iu the context of inferenc.es from a 
defendant's failure to testify, a prohibited comment which 
eould not serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecution'15 
case must, to prove prejudicial, at least touch a live nerve in 
the defense, not one which has been rendered inert· by such 
intrinsic improbability as would prevent it from generating 
any real doubt in the mind of a reasoning juror. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino' County. John P. Knauf, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for first degree robbery and attempted murder. 
Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Jimmie Lee Ross, in pro. per., and Bertram H. Ross, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Ap-
pellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Walter R. Jones, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
[14] See Oal.Jur.2d. Trial, § 436. 
) 
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McCOMB, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction of (a) robbery in the first degree and (b) 
attempted murder. 
Pacts: Walter Williams, general manager of a San Bernar-
dino ice cream company, was in his office about 10 p.m. on 
September 20, 1964, counting daily receipts. A company 
driver, Mr. Asa Brown, was present. A person later identified 
as defendant appeared at the door and declared, "This is a 
stickup, Walt." Mr. Williams, known by that nickname, had 
never seen the person before. The intruder wore black shoes, 
dark trousers, a zippered jacket, gloves, and a woman's nylon 
stocking over his head. He was carrying a single-barreled 
shotgun with tape around it. The gun was pointed at the head 
'and chest of Mr. Brown seated at the office desk. 
The intruder ordered the two employees to get down on the 
:floor and face the wall. They complied with the order, 
although Williams continued to face in the direction of the 
intruder and was thus able to observe the thief take an 
unknown amount of currency from the desk and place it in 
his pocket. The thief then said, "Let's go to the safe room." 
The employees were ordered to open the safe and to again get 
down on the floor. 
The n~on lights in the room were defective and occasionally 
1Uckerea, prompting the thief to say, "What is that' Who 
turned that light on' You know, if anybody walks through 
that back door now, he is a dead man." The thief reached 
into the safe for a large sack of money, and finding it too 
heavy to lift with one hand he placed the shotgun on the floor 
to use both of his hands. Williams yelled, "Let's get him," 
and the employees rushed the intruder. The thief was able to 
regain possession of the gun and used it as a club, striking 
Williams repeatedly on the head, arms and body. During the 
scuftle with their assailant, both employees were able to closely 
observe his features despite the stocking. They later positively 
identified defendant as the robber. 
Mr. Brown broke away to call the police, while Williams 
continued the struggle, but the thief was able to escape with a 
sack containing rolled money and currency. Williams later 
estimated the entire amount taken was approximately $800. 
As the thief fled he warned "Don't come any closer or I 
will shoot." Nevertheless, Williams and Brown followed him 
outside and saw him retreating with the shotgun and a travel-
ing bag. The thief pointed the gun at them and ordered, 
"Don't try to follow; get back." After the robber disap-
) 
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peared from view, Williams advanced to the corner of the 
building and observed a person he believed to be the thief 
behind an automobile approximately 100 feet away. He next 
heard a blast from a shotgun and felt pellets strike both legs. 
Police officers arrived shortly thereafter, and during their 
investigation they found coins lying on the street where the 
shot was fired. Bystanders provided a description of the 
suspect's automobile, and Brown described the physical 
characteristics of the thief. This information was transmitted 
by radio to a police dispatcher, who alerted all units. 
About 10 :40 p.m. a vehicle answering the radio description 
was sighted by a San Bernardino police patrol unit. The-
officers immediately attempted to halt the vehicle with a red 
light and siren. Instead of stopping, the driver accelerated 
and attempted to evade pursuit. Realizing the fleeing automo-
bile was not going to stop, the officers fired seven shots during 
the ensuing pursuit, to which the suspect responded with a 
shotgun blast. During the pursuit the officers were able to 
observe that the driver of the vehicle wore a white shirt and 
red vest. 
During the chase the officers were in radio contact with 
other police units, and when the pursuit reached the jurisdic-
tional border of the neighboring community of Colton, an 
alerted police unit was waiting to interc~pt. The latter took 
over with red light, siren and spotlight~ The driver of the 
suspect vehicle leaned out of the car window and swung a 
taped, sawed-off shotgun towards the pursuing Colton police 
approximately two c·ar lengths behind. The officer beamed his 
spotlight directly into the suspect's face and slid down on the 
front seat. He saw a flash and heard the report of the shot-
gun. Pellets struck the police vehicle, breaking a headlight, 
puncturing the radiator, and richocheting off the windshield. 
Pursuit, however, continued until the escape route became 
blocked by gates to a mill yard entrance. The suspect 
increased his speed and broke through, but further progress 
was prevented by a variety of materials stacked in the yard. 
As the suspect jumped from his vehicle, the officer trained a 
spotlight directly on the fugitive, who looked back toward the 
light, enabling the officer to observe at close range his face 
and profile. The officer later positively identified defendant as 
tht> person pursued. 
The suspect began to run despite an order to haIt. The 
officer returned to the police unit and radioed a report in 
) 
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which he described the suspect as blond, wearing a white 
shirt, tie, dark trousers and a bright red vest. 
A San Bernardino police vehicle, who had been monitoring 
the chase by radio and heard the description, observed a man 
in a white shirt, black pants and a red sweater vest walking 
across an open field. He was carrying a necktie in his hand, 
his clothes were disheveled, and he appeared to be tired. 
Defendant was arrested and transported to the San Bernar-
dino city jail. An examination was made of the suspect 
vehicle, identified as belonging to defendant. Officers discov-
ered therein $131 in currency, $298 in rolled coin, $154.23 in 
loose coin, five money bags, shotgun shells, numerous articles 
of clothing, a traveling bag, and a pair of gloves. The money 
bags contained daily receipts and stamped coin wrappers 
identified as belonging to the plundered ice cream company. 
Also recovered was a check bearing the endorsement of Asa 
Brown whic:\l he had cashed and placed in the company safe 
prior to tbe robbery. Approximately 100 feet from defend-
ant's abandoned vehicle, officers found a sawed-off shotgun 
with white tape on the barrel. 
The day following the robbery Brown was reque~ted to view 
a police showup, and he identified defendant as th~ thief from 
a line~ of four persons. 
Questions: First. Was the incidental search of defendant's 
person proper' 
Yes. [1] It is axiomatic that a search of the person inci-
dental to a lawful arrest is valid. (United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 60, 64 [94 L.Ed. 653, 657, 659, 70 S.Ct. 
430] ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 [70 L.Ed. 145, 
148, 46 S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409] ; People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 
645, 648 [2a] [290 P.2d 531] ; In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 761-
762 [9] [264 P.2d 513].) 
A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant 
whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to 
be arrested has committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 
(3).) [2] "Reasonable cause" is defined as that state of 
facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to 
believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong 
suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime. (People v. 
Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [2] [2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577] ; 
People v. Fischer, 49 Ca1.2d 442, 446 [1] [317 P.2d 967].) 
[3] No exact formula exists for determining reasonable 
cause, and each case must be decided on the facts and circum-
70 PEOPLE v. Ross [67 C.2d 
stances presented to the officers at the time they were required 
to act. (People v. Ingle, supra, at p. 412 [1] ; People v. Fergu".· 
son, 214 Cal.App.2d 772, 775 [4] [29 Cal.Rptr. 691].) 
[4, 5] The arresting officers, through official radio commu-
nicatio~, were fully apprized of the commission of an armed 
robbery; they had a description of the car, which they had 
pursuedllntil the Colton police took command; they also had 
a detailed description of the driver from the Colton police and 
they knew that the pursuit had terminated at the mill yard. 
They were entitled to rely on information from official 
sources. (People v. Estrada, 234 Cal.App.2d 136, 152 [11] [44 
Cal.Rptr. 165, 11 A.L.R.3d 1307]; People v. Schellin, 227 
Cal.App.2d 245, 251 [7] [38 CatRptr. 593].) Shortly there-
after, while patrolling in the vicinity of the mill yard, the 
officers observed defendant walking through an open field; his 
descl'iption matcheu precisely that given by the officer who 
had him in the spotlight; his clothes were disheveled, anq _h~ 
appeared tired. The arresting officers clearly had probable 
cause to arrest defendant, and the incidental search of his 
person was, therefore, valid. (Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175-176 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890-1891, 69 S.Ct. 1302] ; 
P~ople v. Schader, 62 Ca1.2d 716, 722 [2a], 725 [2b] [44 Cal. 
Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665].) 
[6a] Second. Was the seizure of defendant's personal 
effects, including money found on h·is person, lawful' 
Yes. [7] A search of an arrested person at the time of 
his booking has always been considered contemporaneous to 
his arrest and is a reasonable search. His personal effects may 
be removed from him; the police may examine them to see if 
they have been stolen, return them to the prisoner on his 
release, or preserve them for use as evidence at the time of 
trial. (People v. Rogers, 241 Cal.App.2d 384, 389 [7-8] [50 
Cal.Rptr. 559] ; People v. lVicklif/, 144 Cal.App.2d 207, 213 
[6] [300 P.2d 749] ; Bruce v. Sibeck, 25 Gal.App.2d 691, 697-
698 [3] [78 P.2d 741].) 
Section 1412 of the Penal Code provides that when" money 
or other property" is taken from an arrested' defendant the i . 
officer taking it must give a receipt therefor. This statutory 
requirement necessarily assumes that "money or other 
property" may be lawfully seized from one arrested for a 
crime. (44 CaI.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 23, pp. 305-
306.) [6b] The fact that the court ordered a portion of the 
money found on defendant's person at the time of his arrest 
returned prior to trial does not derogate the fact of its lawful 
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seizure. The money was surplus to the amount reported stolen 
from the ice cream company, and the overage was not 
involved with issues in the present case. 
[8] Third. Were defendant's clothes and money properly 
admitted in evidence T 
Yes. The personal effects taken from defendant which were 
of evidentiary value were properly received in evidence. (Peo-
ple v. Davis, 205 Cal.App.2d 517, 521 [7] [23 Cal.Rptr. 152].) 
Where a defendant is charged with robbery, evidence relating 
to money found on his person when arrested is relevant and 
admissible, particularly where, as here, the employees testified 
that they saw defendant take money from the company dC's1\: 
and place it in his pocket. 
The fact that the money was not identified as the coins or 
currency taken in the robbery did not require its exclusion. In 
People v. Harsch, 44 Cal.App.2d 572 [112 P.2d 654],. the 
defendant made a similar objection to the admission of money 
and coins found in his car and on his person at the time of his 
arrest. The court at page 576 stated: "While it is true that 
the coins were not capable of identification, and appellant 
said he obtained them in a crap game, nevertheless, it was 
definitely established by the testimony of the two men, who 
were held up, that the money taken from the cash register 
co~isted mainly of small change, consequently, the coins 
found in appellant's car at the time of the arrest were 
'admissible in evidence, not as being sufficient in themselves to 
warrant or sustain his conviction, but as a circumstance which 
it was proper to place before the jury for their consideration 
in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant [cita- . 
tion].' " (See also People v. Hickok, 198 Cal.App.2d 442, 444-
445 [lb] [17 Cal.Rptr. 875].) 
Furthermore, it should be noted that defendant made no 
objection at the trial to the introduction of his personal effects 
into evidence1 on the ground of unlawful search and seizure, 
and he cannot raise the matter for the firE!t time on appeal. 
(People v. Talbot, 64 Ca1.2d 691, 709 [11] [51 Cal.Rptr. 417, 
414 P.2d 633] ; People v. Cockrell, 63 Ca1.2d 659, 667 [9] [47 
Cal.Rptr. 788,408 P.2d 116].) 
[9a] Fourth. Was defendant prejudiced by his appear-
ance in handcuffs! 
ITbe record sbows that before defendant's personal effects (clothes, 
gloves, tie, wallet, identification, etc.) were admitted in evidence, defend-
ant's counsel and tbe prosecutor stipulated tbat certain identification 
papers disclosing defendant's parole number be excluded. There was no 
objection to the other items. 
• 
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No. In the presence of the jury, defendant was brought into 
the courtroom handcuffed, and the restraints were removed 
prior to the initiation of any judicial proceedings. In cham-
bers, defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied. 
[10] In general, unless there is danger of escape, an 
accused is entitled to appear during the progress of his trial 
free of shackles. (People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 [10 Am. 
Rep. 296].) However, "When reasonable precautions are 
taken to retain custody of an accused the fact that they bring 
before the jury information that a defendant is a convict and 
perhaps a dangerous character does not deprive him of a fair 
trial" (People v. Burwell, 44 Cal2d 16, 32 [14] [279 P.2d 
744].) 
[9b] In the present case, defendant was facing a life sen-
tence and had been previously convicted of robbery. It was a 
reasonable practice for the sheriff to keep prisoners hand-
cuffed while in transit, and the fact that the handcuffs were 
removed inside the courtroom rather' than outside added to 
the security. (See People v. Hillery, 65 Ca1.2d 795, 805-806 
[5] [~6 Cal.Rptr. 280, 423 P.2d 208].) There was no harmful 
effect: of such practice, since the jury knew defendant was in 
custody. 
Unlike People v. Harrington, supra, 42 Cal. 165, and People 
v. Thompson, 23 CalApp.2d 339 [72 P.2d 927], where the 
defendants were chained and shackled during the progress of 
their trials, here the handcuffs were removed after the sheriff 
brought defendant into the courtroom. Moreover, in the 
Thompson case, the error was held not prejudicial because the 
defendant's guilt was so clear and convincing that no miscar-
riage of justice resulted. 
[11] Fifth. lVas it prejudicial error to admit a picture of 
a police lineup in which defenda,nt was clothed in coveralls 
and the others in street clothes 1 
No. In People v. Branch, 127 Cal.App.2d 438, 440 [1] [274 
P.2d 31], identification by means of a standard police lineup 
was discussed. It was held that a police "showup" is not 
based on any legal requirement but is designed to assist the 
jury in weighing evidence relative to identification. In the 
present case, the introduction of the picture may have been 
advantageous to defendant, rather than prejudicial, since it 
afforded him an opportunity to impeach the veracity of the 
lineup identification. The circumstances of the identification 
was a matter to be considered by the jury in determining the 
weight it should be given. (People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 
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179 [1] [217 P.2d 1] ; People v. Shaw, 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 
622 [12] [47 Cal.Rptr. 96].) 
Sixth. Did the prosecutor's comments and the court's 
instruction on defendant's failure to testify constitute harm-
less error T 
Yes. [12] At the time of defendant's trial, the Cali-
fornia Constitution permitted comment by the court and 
counsel on an accused's failure to testify (art. I, § 13). 
Thereafter, on April 28, 1965, the United States Supreme 
Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 
85 8.Ct. 1229], held that adverse comment violated the privi-
lege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth A1l1endment. 
The Griffin rule is applicable to cases pending on direct 
apP'eal at the time it was announced. (See Tehan v. Shott, 382 
U.S. 406, 409, fn. 3 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 8.Ct. 459] ; People v. 
Perez, 65 Cal.2d 615, 620 [4], fn. 2 [55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 
P.2d 597] ; People v. lng, 65 Cal.2d 603, 609 [1], fn. 2 [55 
Cal.Rptr. 902,422 P.2d 590].) 
In Ohapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 
S.ctt. 824], the Supreme Court held that constitutional errors 
do not require automatic reversal of convictions without 
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, but that 
"before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, 
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." (386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 
at pp. 710-711].) 
.We have recently recognized that the Chapman rule does 
not permit us to affirm a conviction" simply because we deem 
it improbable that a result more favorable to the defendant 
would have been reached in the absence of the Griffin error." 
(People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 712 [59 Cal. 
Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788].) The Supreme Court required in 
Ohapman that we focus on "reasonable possibility" rather 
than "probability" (386 U.S. at p 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 
710]) and that we cast "on someone other than the person 
prejudiced by [a federal constitutional error] a burden to 
show that it was harmless." (ld. at p. 24 [17 J,J.Ed.2d at p. 
710].) The court did not, however, require that we ignore the 
possible impact of the error upon the outcome of the case. 
In this connection, the meaning of the court's reference to 
errors which " 'might have contributed to the conviction' " 
(w. at p. 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710]) becomes clear in the 
~--
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context of the entire opinion, since the court expressly stated 
that it sought "a rule that will save the good in harmless-
error practices while avoiding the bad." (Ibid.) The court 
explained the "good" which it wished to preserve by its 
formulation: Harmlcss error rules, the court said, "serve a 
very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convic-
tions for small errors or defects that have Uttle, if any, likeli. 
hood of having changed the result of the trial." (ld. at p. 22 
[17 L.Ed.2d at p. 709] ; italics added.) 
[13] In essence, then, the court avoided any statement of 
intention to compel the reversal of convictions on the basis of 
errors which are "harmless' 'in the sense that there is no 
reasonable possibility of their having affected the outcome of 
the trial. The prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a federal constitutional error proved 
harmless in this sense; once that burden has been discharged, 
the error "no longer serves as a basis for reversal." (People 
v. Modesto, supra, 66 Ca1.2d at p. 712.) 
[14a] Thus, in applying its rule to the circumstances of 
the case before it, the court in Chapman stressed the fact that 
" absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair. 
minded jurors might very well have brought in not-gUilty 
verdicts." (386 U.S. at pp. 25-26 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) On 
, the compelling record which we have summarized above, we 
can conceive of no reasonable possibility that this jury could 
have reached any verdict other than one of guilt even if the 
prohibited comments2 had never been uttered. 
2The trial court gave the standard instruction permitting the jury to 
draw an inference adverse to defendant from his failure to e%plain or 
deny facts within his knowledge. 
In his closing argument the deputy district attorney said: " ••• The 
witness cannot be compelled to testify. He has a eonstitutional right to---
remain silen t. 
"We have the burden of proof and we have to prove the charges 
involved in this case. Remember, where a defendant fails to testify and 
there are facts within his own knowledge, facts within his own knowledge 
which he cannot explain or deny such as the facts in this case, he can very 
well say, 'I didn't go into this place. You have got the wrong man.' 
, 'In fact that is probably the argument you will hear, but he hasn't 
even denied or explained any aggregated circumstances. 
, , So you may take his failure to e%plain all that as indicating they are 
true. And the inference that he may draw from our evidence is that the 
evidence is probably true and as adduced in this ease." 
With reference to defendant's crashing through a gate when his escape 
route was blocked, the prosecutor said: "What do you think of a person 
who would deliberately ram through a fence that way' You can see that 
he ran right through the fence. Deliberately slowed down and ran right 
through it. What kind of a person are we dealing with in this case' He 
I 
j 
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Defendant's attorney in no way suggested here, either 
through the testimony of witnesses or in argument to the 
jury, that someone other than the defendant might have 
perpetrated this crime and that the defendant might simply 
have driven the getaway car from the scene of the robbery or 
that he might have replaced the robber in the car at some 
later time. Thus, as the case was presented to this jury, only 
two conclusions were possible: Either the defendant's posses-
sion of a vehicle matching the getaway car and containing the 
proceeds of the robbery was purely fortuitous, or the defend-
ant must have been the robber. Given the fact that the 
defendant fled from the police and fired at them with a sawed-
off shotgun similar to that used in the course of the robbery, 
the first of these two possibilities evaporated into the inher-
ently incredible, leaving no real gap in the prosecution's case. 
[15] Under these circumstances, our remarks in People v. 
Modesto, supra, 66 Ca1.2d at p. 714, bear repetition here : 
"In order to prove prejudicial, a comment which could not 
serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecution's case must 
at least touch a live nerve in the defense, not one which has 
~en rendered inert by such intrinsic improbability as would 
prevent it from generating any real doubt in the mind of a 
reasoning juror. Thus the posture of the defense in the 
instant case minimized to the point of insignificance the possi-
ble impact of the comment." [14b] We need not speculate 
here whether the comment might have assumed significance if 
the defense had planted the suggestion that the defendant had 
an accomplice who actually committed the robbery and did 
the shooting; our function under Chapman is not to assess the 
prejudicial impact of an error in a trial which did not occur 
but to evaluate that impact as the case in fact unfolded at this 
trial. Placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution, we 
have concluded that the challenged comments proved entirely 
inconsequential in the case before us. Accordingly, Chapman 
does not require the state to conduct a new trial. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
hasn't even come up here to deny any of this. We have all those photo-
graphs. You can look at them." 
Near the end of his argument the prosecutor said: "Folks, I think 
that I usually talk about an hour, but in this ease the evidence is so over-
whelming, yet the evidence is so aggravating, so terrifying, and he, as I 
have been saying, he hasn't wanted even to get up here and say, I I 
didn't do it.' He is not guilty, but he could say that much. " 
... 
) 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent. 
The record establishes that the instruction and comment on 
defendant's failure to testify were prejudicial under Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 
824]. 
A jury found defendant guilty of the robbery of an . ice 
cream company and the attempted murder of the manager, 
Walter Williams. The robber, who was masked, carried a 
sawed-off shotgun and threatened to use it during the course 
of the robbery. He warned Williams and Brown, the assistant 
manager, not to follow him out of the plant. Williams did so, 
however, and was shot in the leg by pellets from a shotgun. 
Although Williams could not see his assailant, who was 
hidden behind an automobile a hundred feet away, he believed 
that the fleeing robber fired the shot. 
Brown gave police officers a description of the robber, and 
bystanders gave them a description of the suspect's automo-
bile. Approximately 40 minutes after the robbery, a police 
unit saw a car answering the description given by the 
bystanders. The driver was wearing a distinctive red vest, 
white shirt, and dark tie. The officers pursued, the car, and. 
during the chase the driver fired a shotgun at them. They 
followed .the car until it was driven to a dead end and aban-
! doned. They arrested defendant not far from the abandoned 
: ear. He was wearing a red vest and white shirt and had a 
dark tie in his hand. The officers identified him as the driver 
of the car. They found a sawed-off shotgun and the proceeds 
of the robbery in the car, which was. regist.ered in defendant's 
name. 
Although defendant was linked to the car and the car was 
linked to the robbery, the only direct link to the commission 
of the robbery and the attempted murder was the doubtful 
identification of defendant by Williams and Brown. 
Williams identified defendant as the robber at the trial, but 
the identification could have been disbelieved or deemed 
unreliable by the jury. He admitted under cross-examination ___ _ 
that he could not remember any distinctive feature of the 
robber or his clothing. The robber was masked, and Williams 
did not supply the officers with any usable description of 
him. 
Brown's identification of defendant as the robber could 
also have been disbelieved or deemed unreliable by the jury. 
He described the robber as wearing tan pants and having 
dark hair. Defendant hus blond hair and was wearing dark .o; 
II 
) 
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pants when he was arrested. Brown admittedly had less 
opportunity than Williams had to see the robber during the 
course of the robbery. Brown did not mention the distinctive 
red vest, white shirt, and dark tie, described by the officers 
and used by them as a basis for identifying defendant as the 
driver of the car. Moreover, his description of the robber did 
not aid the officers in their pursuit. 
Brown identified defendant in a police showup, but this 
identification could also have been disbelieved or deemed 
unreliable by the jury. Defendant was dressed differently 
from the others at the showup; he wore coveralls, but the 
other participants wore street clothing. (Cf. United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926] ; Gilbert 
v. Oalifornia, 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178], 87 S.Ct. 1951] ; 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 
1967] .) 
Defendant's identification by Williams and Brown was 
subject to doubt on another ground. Defendant was a stranger 
to the ice cream company's plant, and neither Williams nor 
Brown had ever seen him, before. The robber, however, was 
familiar with the plant. He called \Villiams ' , Walt, " a name 
used only by Williams' associates; he knew that the area 
where the company safe was kept was called the ' 'safe 
room"; and he knew the location of the "safe room." This 
evidence that the robber was an insider or had a co-conspira-
tor who was an insider casts considerable doubt on defend-
ant's being the robber. There may have been two men 
involved, one who committed the robbery and attempted 
murder and another who either waited in the car or joined the 
robber later. If the robber left the car in the possession of 
another man during the 40-minute period before it was seen 
by the police unit, that circumstance would explain the inac-
curate descriptions of the clothing and hair color of the 
robber as compared with the person ultimately arrested. 
At the outset of his argument the prosecutor stated that the 
weak point in his case was the lack of clear identification of 
defendant as the robber. 1 He admitted the difficulty of infer-
ring that because defendant was linked to the car and the car 
was linked to the robbery, defendant committed the robbery 
and attempted the murder of Williams. To bolster his case, 
1" In this case I am not going to discuss the elements. The crime was 
committed. The fact is undisputed that there was a robbery and there 
was an attempted murder. There is no question about that at all. The 
only failure is-we haven't proved that the defendant was responsible." 
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the prosecutor relied heavily on de~endant 's . failure to take 
the stand and deny that he was the robber and attempted 
murderer. He told the jury that defendant's failure to deny 
or explain the facts in the case allowed them to consider as 
true the inferences most favorable to the prosecution. Each 
time the prosecutor's argument faltered he relied heavily on 
comment on defendant's silence, and the court's instruction 
expressly sanctioned the drawing of adverse inferences there-
from by the jury.2 
Although the prosecutor might have proceeded on the 
theory that defendant was either the actual robber or an 
accessory who drove the getaway car, he chose to try the case 
solely on the more difficult theory that defendant personally 
committed the robbery and the attempted murder. Moreover, 
he admitted that the state's case left room for doubt as to 
defendant's guilt. Since defendant presented no evidence, his 
defense was necessarily based on the weakness of the eyewit-
ness identification and the gaps in the circumstantial evidence 
linking him to the actual commission of the robbery. His 
2" Remember, where a defendant fails to testify and there are facts 
within his own knowledge, facts within his own knowledge which he cannot 
expla~ or deny such as the facts in this case, he can very well say, 'I 
didn't go into this place. You llave got the wrong man.' In fact that is 
probably the argument you will hear, but he hasn't even denied or ex-
plained any aggregated circumstances. So you may take his failure to 
explain all that as indicating they are true .••. 
"What kind of person are we dealing with in this case' He hasn't 
come up here to deny any of tbis. . • . 
"Folks, I think that I usually talk about an hour, but in this case the 
evidence is so overwhelming, yet the evid~nce is so aggravating, 80 
terrifying, and he, as I have been saying, he hasn't wanted even to get 
up here and say, 'I didn't do it.' He is not guilty, but he could say that 
much .... 
, , We connect tIle robbery tllrougll tlle identification of the property of 
yours. How did I get it' He didn't even take the witness stand. And 
he explained tbis was his car. He wasn't driving it. And to explain how 
tbis money got in there, and what would you say if you found money like 
that in my car just soon after the robbery' What would you think I was 
up to' Going out for a picnic or something like that! This is proof of . 
a robbery, in the position of a robber and murderer very soon after the 
offense ...• 
"And the comment which Mr. Arias [defendant's counsel] made was 
heyond the evidence. There is no question that Mr. Ross didn't walk into 
that place. There is no evidence by him saying that he did not walk 
into this place. He didn't offer any testimony at all." 
The court instructed the jury concerning the defendant's failure to 
testify as follows: "As to allY evidence or facts against him which the 
defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts 
within bis knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify, 
he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure 
into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and 88", 
indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn there-
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counsel pointed out to the jury that defendant was charged 
with actually committing the robbery and attempted murder, 
and he urged that the evidence established a reasonable doubt. 
He thus relied on the fixed procedural requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is for the jury to determine whether the balance of 
probabilities excludes a reasonable doubt. Unless that balance 
appears from the evidence so overwhelming that no reasonable 
juror could entertain a reasonable doubt, argument and 
instruction" that among the inferences that may be reasona-
bly drawn from [the evidence] those unfavorable to the 
defendant are the more probable,' '3 necessarily vitiate the 
defense of reasonable doubt. Under such instruction and 
argument doubts need not be resolved in favor of the defend-
ant but may be resolved in favor of the prosecution, thereby 
enhancing the probabilities of a guilty verdict. By diminish-
ing the fixed procedural requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the error deprived defendant of a substan-
tial right and denied him a fair trial. (Bollenbach v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 [90 L.Ed. 350, 355, 66 S.Ct. 402] ; 
Bihn v. UnitedJ States, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [90 L.Ed. 1484, 1487-
1488, 66 8.Ct. 1172] ; see also Boatright v. United States, 105 
F.2d 737, 740.) Moreover, since it served to stifle the doubts 
that might reasonably have been engendered by the inconsis-
tencies in the prosecution's cirumstantial case, it may even 
have carried decisive weight with the jury. Accordingly, the 
Attorney General has not established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not contribute to the result. (Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 26 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-
711, 87 8.Ct. 824].) 
The majority opinion states that" on the compelling record 
which we have summarized . . . we can conceive of no rea-
sonable possibility that this jury could have reached any ver-
dict other than one of guilt even if the prohibited comments 
had never been uttered." Even if this factual assumption 
were correct, it is one that should never be allowed to under-
mine our commitment to procedural fairness. "Are we then to 
disregard errors no matter how substantial, if upon a review 
of the evidence we are satisfied with the verdict of the jury T 
Such a course will simply Plean in the long run the abolishing 
of all forms of law taught by experience to be necessary to the 
protection of the innocent." (People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 
8This statement is from the trial judge's eharge. See footnote 2, supra. 
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600, 619 [107 N.E. 1058, 1064]; People v. Nuzzo, 294 N.Y. 
227,235-236 [62 N.E.2d 47, 51].) Verdicts that may be based 
on constitutional error must not be allowed to stand. (Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 [8 L.Ed.2d 758, 762, 82 
S.Ct. 1417] ; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 
[87 L.Ed. 279,282,63 S.Ct. 207, 143 A.L.R 1273] ; Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 [75 L.Ed. 1117, 1122, 51 S.Ot. 
532,73 A.L.R. 1484].) 
In our own cases we have stated that" [t]he fact that a 
record shows a defendant to be guilty of a crime does not 
necessarily determine that there has not been a miscarriage of 
justice." (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 [258 P. 607] 
[disparaging comments by judge] ; see also People v. Conley, 
64 Ca1.2d 310, 319-320 [49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911] [right 
to jury trial on every significant issue] ; People v. McKay, 37 
Ca1.2d 192, 798-800 [236 P.2d 145] [unfair pretrial pub-
licity]; People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Ca1.2d 7, 10-11 [161 P.2d 
934] [various errors causing denial of a fair trial] ; People v. 
Patubo, 9 Cal.2d 537, 542-543 [71 P.2d 270, 113 P.2d 1303] 
[disparaging comments by judge] ; People v. Muza, 178 Cal. 
App.2d 901, 913-914 [3 Cal.Rptr. 395], cert.den. 369 U.S. 839 
[7 L.Ed.2d 843, 82 S.Ct. 869] [remarks of trial judge] ; Peo-
ple v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.App.2d 823, 828-831, 111 P.2d 659] 
[misconduct of prosecution].) Similarly in People v. Spencer, 
66 Cal.2d 158,' 163 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715], the 
court, faced with a nonprejudicial confession under the rule 
of People v. Cotter, 63 Cal.2d 386, 398 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 
P.2d 862], refused to rest" affirmance of the judgment solely 
upon our evaluation of the minor effect of the defendant's 
confession upon the jury;" we must still weigh its impact upon 
defendant's trial." In following Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 
U.S. 85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229], and Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, supra, 386 U.S. 18, we were concerned with procedural 
fairness, with the integrity of the judicial process, as well as 
with the outcome of the case. It bears emphasis that we cannot 
adhere to rules that we would adopt were the final responsi-
bilityours (see People v. Modesto, 62 Ca1.2d 436, 447-454 [42 
Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753] ; People v. Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 
818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), but must faithfully adhere to the 
United States Constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court. <:~ 
By focusing solely on the outcome of the case, the majority 
opinion misconceives the purpose of the harmless error rule as 
it has developed in the federal courts. Chapman stands at tIle 
C) 
July 1967] PEOPLE 11. Ross 
[67 C.2d 64; 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606] 
81 
end of a long line of Supreme Court cases determining the 
standards for harmless error in criminal cases,4 in which the 
court benefited from a remarkable dialogue in the Second Cir-
cuitG whose principal participants were Learned Hand and 
Jerome Frank. Since the earlier federal standards were less 
favorable to defendants than the Fahy-Chapman standard, 
except for those errors deemed automatically prejudicial, 
error that would have been reversible under the earlier cases 
is a fortiori reversible now. Under those cases the majority 
opinion in the present case errs by independently determining 
guilt or innocence (Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 
[89 L.Ed. 495,499, 65 8.0t. 548, 156 A.L.R. 496]), impliedly 
speculating on the possibility of reconviction (Kotteako8 v. 
United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-
1566]), and considering the evidence without the error and 
thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict 
(Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [90 L.Ed. 
1485, 1488] ; Fahy v. Oonnecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 
[11 L.Ed.2d 171, 174-176]). 
Review of the development of the harmless error rule 
demonstrates that it, cannot be lightly invoked to cure consti-
tutional error. Roscbe Pound, an early advocate of harmless 
error reform in the United States, attacked the "Exchequer 
rule"6 that required reversal for all errors and stated that 
4See, e.g., Horning v. District of Oolumbia, 254 U.S. 135 [65 L.Ed. 
185,41 S.Ot. 53]; Sinclair v. United State8, 279 U.S. 749 [73 L.Ed. 938, 
49 S.Ot. 471, 63 A.L.R. 1258]; Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 
315 [75 L.Ed. 1054, 1058, 51 S.Ot. 470, 73 A.L.R. 1203]; [dissenting 
opinion]; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 [79 L.Ed. 1314, 55 S.Ot. 
629]; Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 [84 L.Ed. 257,60 S.Ot. 198]; 
United States v. Sooony-VaclIlum Oil 00., 310 U.S. 150 [84 L.Ed. 1129, 
60 S.Ot. 811]; Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 [89 L.Ed. 495, 65 
S.Ot. 548, 156 A.L.R. 496]; Bollenbaoh v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 
[90 L.Ed. 350, 66 S.Ot. 402]; Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633; 
Kottea1co8 v. United State8, 328 U.S. 750 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 66 S.Ot. 1239]; 
Piswio1c v. United State8, 329 U.S. 211 [91 L.Ed. 196, 67 S.Ot. 224]; 
Krulewitoh v. United State8, 336 U.S. 440 [93 L.Ed. 790, 69 S.Ot. 716]. 
6United States v. Berger, 73 F.2d 278, revd. 295 U.S. 78 [79 L.Ed. 1314~ 
55 S.Ot. 629]; United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, revd. 308 U.S. 287 
[84 L.Ed. 257, 60 S.Ot. 198]; United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995; United 
States v. Mitohell, 137 F.2d 1006; United States v. Bollenbaoh, 147 F.2d 
199, revd. 326 U.S. 607 [90 L.Ed. 350, 66 S.Ot. 402]; United States v. 
Le1caoo8, 151 F.2d 170, revd. 328 U.S. 750 [90 L.Ed. 1557,66 S.Ot. 1239]; 
Uf&ited State8 v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915; United State8 v.Bennett, 
152 F.2d 342, revd. sub. nom., Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633 [90 
L.Ed. 1485, 66 S.Ot. 1172]; Uftited States v. Antonelli Fireworks 00., 155 
F.2d 631; United States v. Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943, revd. 336 U.S. 440 
[93 L.Ed. 790, 69 S.Ct. 716]. 
80rease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 933, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835). 
See generally 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 21 (3d ed. 1940). A harmless error 
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"the worst feature (If American procedure is the lavish grant-
ing of new trials." (Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatis-
faction with the Administration of Justice (1906) 29 A.B.A. 
Rep. 395, 413; see also (1908) 33 A.B.A.Rep. 542, 545, fn. 1 
[bibliography of other contemporary criticism].) In 1907 the 
American Bar Association established a Special Committee to 
Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent 
Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation. «1907) 31 A.B.A. 
Rep. 505.) The Special Committee recommended the enact-
ment of a statute «1908) 33 A.B.A.Rep. 542, 550) that was 
introduced in Congress in 1908 and reintroduced in 1909 in a 
slightly modified form (S. 4568, H.R. 14,552). A supporting 
brief stated that the purpose of the bill was to stop "reversals 
for technical defects in the procedure below." «1910) 35 
A.B.A.Rep. 624.) Contemporaneously with the hearings on 
the A.B.A. "technical error" bill in Congress, Senator A. E. 
Boynton of the California Legislature proposed an amend-
ment to the California Constitution substantially the same as 
the A.B.A. bill. T The Legislature adopted the proposed 
amendment, and it was placed on the ballot. The official argu-
ment to the voters describes the reasons for the reform move-
ment in the United States and presents examples of technical 
errors complained of by the reformers.8 The California consti-
rule had been prevalent befo~e that time "as there could not be a new 
trial in felony, such a conviction ought not to be set aside [fn. omitted]. 
because some other evidence had been given which ought not to have been 
received." (Rea: v. Ball, Russ & Ry. (1807) 132,133,168 Eng. Rep. 721.) 
The rule requiring per se reversals became the prevailing rule in this 
country. (Wigmore, Evidence, supra, § 21.) 
1"No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted in any criminal 
case on the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission 
or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or 
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire eause including the 
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of 
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (2 Cal. Stats. 1911, Res. Ch. 
36, p. 1798 (Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26).) The language in the A.B.A. 
bill and the California constitutional amendment was suggested by Order 
29, rule 6, of the Rules of the English Supreme Court of Judicature. (See 
(1910) 3;j A.B.A. Rep. 614, 615.) . 
8Statement of Senator A. E. Boynton: " ... The absurd lengths to 
which courts have gone in the reversal of cases for immaterial errors is 
shown by a recital of a few examples: In Missouri a case was reversed 
and the prisoner escaped conviction because the indictment alleged the 
deceased 'instantly died' instead of charging according to t~ ancient 
formula that he 'did then and there die.' In a Texas case the elimination 
of the letter' r' from the word' first' sa.ved a murderer from the gallows, 
when his guilt was absolutely determined. In our own state a conviction 
for murder was set aside because the indictment failed to state that the 
man killed was a human being. . . . 
The Missouri ease was a commonly used example durin~ the reform 
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tutional amendment was adopted on October 10, 1911, and the 
federal harmless error rule was adopted by Congress in 1919.9 
Based on this history the Supreme Court stated that the 
federal harmless error statute was intended" to prevent mat-
ters concerned with the' mere etiquette of trials and with the 
formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the 
merits of a verdict." (Bruno v. United States, supra, 308 
U.S. 287, 293-294 [84 L.Ed. 257, 260-261].) "The 'technical 
errors' against which Congress protected jury verdicts are of 
the kind which led some judges to trivialize law by giving all 
legal prescriptions equal potency. See Taft, Administration of 
Criminal LClIW (1905) 15 Yale L.J. 1, 15. Deviations from 
formal correctness do not touch the substance of the standards 
by which guilt is determined in our courts, and it is these that 
Congress rendered harmless .... " (Bollenbach v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 [90 L.Ed. 350, 355, 66 S.Ct. 402].) 
The Supreme Court has construed the federal.rule to place 
the burden on the prosecution to show that "substantial 
rights" were not affected by the error. (Kotteakos v. United 
States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 760 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 1564].) In 
California, on the other hand, the court has consistently 
placed the burden on the appellant attacking the verdict. 
(People v. Watson, supra., 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836-838.) Since the 
period and is cited and discussed in Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 
328 U.S. 750, 760, fn. 14 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 1564]. 
Statement of State Senator E. S. Birdsall:". . . The supreme court 
has held in 21 Cal. 344 that it is a fatal omission to fail to state in an in-
dictment for robbery that the property taken is not the property of the 
person charged, although the very word 'robbery' itself conclusively 
implies this. In 56 Cal. 406 a conviction was set aside because the letter 
'n' was accidentally omitted from the word 'larceny,' though it is prob-
able that no person in the wide world could have had any doubt as to 
the word intended .•.. In 62 Cal. 309 a conviction of murder was re-
versed because the trial court permitted a surgeon who had examined the 
wounds to testify as to the probable position of the deceased when the 
fatal shot was fired. This was in line with the doctrine announced in 
47 Cal. 114 that' every error in the admission of testimony is presumed 
to be injurious unless the contrary clearly appears.' Trial judges of long 
experience declare that it is wholly beyond human skill for the most able 
and conscientious judge, in the course of a long and busy trial extending 
over days or weeks to avoid trifling inaccuracies now and then in the 
thousand and one rulings that they are compelled to make on the spur of 
the moment. . . ." 
928 United States Code section 2111 now provides: "On the hearing 
of an appeal or writ of certiorari in any ease, the court shall give judg-
ment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or 
defects which do not affect the substantial rights pf the parties. " Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 52, subdivision (a), provides: "Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." 
) 
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original focus of harmless error reform was on technical error, 
it has always been recognized that some errors were reversible 
regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (See 
Gideon v. lVainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805, 
83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733] ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 
523 [71 L.Ed. 749, 754,47 8.Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243] ; People 
v. OO'fl.ley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, 319-320; People v. McKay, 
supra, 37 Ca1.2d 792, 798-800; People v. 8arazzawski, supra, 
27 Ca1.2d 7, 10-11; People v. Patubo, supra, 9 Cal.2d 537,542-
543; People v. Mahooell, supra, 201 Cal. 618, 627; People v. 
Muza, supra, 178 CaI.App.2d 901, 913-914, cert.den. 369 U.S. 
839; People v. DUl1ernay, supra, 43 CaI.App.2d 823, 828-831.) 
The Ohapman case establishes, however, that Griffin error is 
not necessarily prejudicial. 
To affirm the judgment under the rule set forth in the 
Chapman case the court must C C be able to declare a belief that· 
[the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (386 
U.S: at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) We must be able to say 
that the Attorney General "has demonstrated, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the trial 
judge's instruction did not contribute to" defendant ts con-
viction. (386 U.S. at p. 26 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711],) This 
language is susceptible of two interpretations, and the Ohap-
man opinion lends support to both. ! 
It may mean only that the court must believe beyond a 
reasonable ·doubt that the result would have been the same in 
the absence of the error. Under this view, if the court con-
cludes beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury· 
could have found the defendant innocent on the same record 
minus the error, it should affirm. This approach is the one this 
court has adopted in interpreting the California harmless 
error rule (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), although our standatii 
for affirmance is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that tie 
result would have been the same, but the absence of a showing 
that it is reasonably probable that the result would have been 
different in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson, 
supra, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836.) Watson makes clear, of course, 
that "reasonably probable" does not mean more probable 
than not. It means only that there appear some substantial 
chance greater than a mere possibility that the result would 
have been different in the absence of the error. Thus the court 
was careful to point out that a reversal is required if it 
cannot be determined whether or not the error affected the 
result, for in such case there "exists . . . at least such an 
) 
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equal balance of reasonable probabilities" that" the court is 
of the opinion 'that it is reasonably probable that a result 
more favorable to the appealing party would have been 
reached in the absence of the error.' " (46 Cal.2d at p. 837.) 
There is language in Ohapman that indicates that the court 
was.concerned with the possibility that the result would have 
been different in the absence of the error. It seems more likely, 
however, that the court deemed a showing beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the result would not have been different as only 
the first step in establishing that a constitutional error was 
not prejudicial. Thus it contrasted "small errors or defects 
that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result 
of the trial" with errors that " 'affect substantial rights' " 
of a party, and it pointed out that" An error in admitting 
plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury 
adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as 
harmless." (Ohapman v. Oalifornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 
[17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 8.Ct. 824, 827-828].) Moreover, it 
expressly rejected this court's reliance on overwhelming evi-
dence to establish harmless error, a rejection that can be 
explained only on :the theory that a substantial error that 
might have contrihnted to the result cannot be deemed harm-
less regardless of how clearly it appears that the jury would 
havc reached the same result by an error-free route had the 
erroneous route been denied it. Overwhelming evidence of 
guilt does not negate the fact that an error that constituted a 
substantial part of the prosecution's case may have played a 
substantial part in the jury's deliberation and thus COll-
tributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have 
reached its verdict because of the error without considering 
other reasons untainted by error that would have supported 
the same result. (Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. 660, 
665 [8 L.Ed.2d 758, 762] ; Williams v. North Oarolina, supra, 
317 U.S. 287, 292 [87 L.Ed. 279, 282]; Stromberg v. CaJi-
fornia, supra, 283 U.S. 359, 368 [75 L.Ed. 1117,1122].) 
The view that Ohapman requires the state to show not only 
that the result would have been tIle same absent the error, but 
also that the error could not have played any substantial part 
in the jury's reaching its verdict, finds support in earlier 
Supreme Court decisions. In determining whether an error is 
substantial, i.e., whether it affected a substantial right of the 
defendant, the court has focused on the part the error may 
have played at the trial. Once it appears that it was a sub-
) 
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stantial part of the prosecution's case, reversal is required. 
Neither the court's own view of the defendant's guilt nor its 
conviction that the jury would have reached the same result 
in the absence of the error can then save the judgment. (Bihn 
v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [90 L.Ed. 1484, 
1488] ; Kotteako.s v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 
[90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566] ; Bo.llenbfreh v. United States, 326 
U.S. 607, 613-614 [90 L.Ed. 350, 354-355, 66 S.Ct. 402] ; Wei-
ler v. United States, supra, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [89 L.Ed. 495, 
499] ; Bruno. v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 [84 L.Ed. 
257, 260-261, 60 S.Ct. 198].) 
In the present case, as in Ohapman, the comments and 
instruction on defendant's silence constituted a substantial 
part of the prosecution's case. It served to make defendant a 
witness against himself by using his silence to stifle the doubts 
that might have been engendered by the inconsistencies in the 
prosecution's case. (Griffin v. Oalifo.rnia, 380 U.S. 609 [14 
L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229].) It denied defendant a substan-
tial right, for it served to deprive him of his only defense. 
Under these circumstances the Attorney General has not 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would 
have been the same in the absence of error. A fo.rtiori, he has 
not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous 
comment and instruction did not in fact contribute to the 
result. 
Peters, J., concurred. 
